Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Realism in Mathematics' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
22764 Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
8755 Maddy replaces pure sets with just objects and perceived sets of objects [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10718 A natural number is a property of sets [Maddy, by Oliver]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
8756 Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17733 We know mind-independent mathematical truths through sets, which rest on experience [Maddy, by Jenkins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22762 Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
22759 Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22760 Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
22763 We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]