16 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
10397 | Abelard's mereology involves privileged and natural divisions, and principal parts [Abelard, by King,P] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
10396 | If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P] |
10395 | Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P] |
15384 | Only words can be 'predicated of many'; the universality is just in its mode of signifying [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
16083 | Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML] |
8481 | The de dicto-de re modality distinction dates back to Abelard [Abelard, by Orenstein] |
15385 | Abelard's problem is the purely singular aspects of things won't account for abstraction [Panaccio on Abelard] |
15383 | Nothing external can truly be predicated of an object [Abelard, by Panaccio] |
17006 | Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML] |
16093 | Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML] |
10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |