11 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |