100 ideas
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |