Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Mental Content' and 'Neutral Relations'

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24 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14217 The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K]
14216 The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K]
14218 A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K]
14220 Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K]
14219 Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]