14 ideas
| 10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
| 10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
| 10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
| 10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
| 10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
| 10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
| 16668 | Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |