Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Syntagma' and 'First-Order Logic'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
10282 Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10283 A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W]
10284 There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W]
10285 I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10288 Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W]
10289 Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
10287 If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10286 A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16730 If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
16619 We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
16593 Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi]
16729 How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi]