26 ideas
23531 | Philosophers should interpret the world, by expressing its possibilities [Berardi] |
23538 | Nothingness only exists in consciousness [Berardi] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
23532 | The delusion of free will brings a sense of guilt [Berardi] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
23537 | American white men trusted the philosophy of winning, and then discovered losing [Berardi] |
23536 | Community is now a nostalgic memory, which no longer exists [Berardi] |
23534 | Communism failed to unite western workers with the oppressed of the south [Berardi] |
23533 | The economy has replaced medieval theocracy at the centre of our society [Berardi] |
23535 | Western workers turn to nationalism, to avert the effects of globalisation [Berardi] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |