27 ideas
| 10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
| 10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
| 10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
| 10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
| 10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
| 10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
| 10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
| 16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
| 10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
| 10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |