Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Letters to Mersenne' and 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes]