Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility', 'Justified Belief as Responsible Belief' and 'Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]