Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Counterparts and Identity' and 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
4568 If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
4574 If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
4573 If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
4575 A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4561 Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4564 I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
4565 The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
4563 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
4562 Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4566 Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
4571 Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
4572 If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
4576 An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]