25 ideas
| 17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
| 17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
| 17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |