15 ideas
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |