16 ideas
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
| 14966 | The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 14967 | Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta] |
| 16328 | Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach] |
| 14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
| 15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
| 15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |