Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic' and 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete [Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound [Kripke, by Rossberg]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula [Kripke, by Simchen]
The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains [Kripke, by Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]