Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Intellectual Autobiography'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner]
Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]