17 ideas
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |