12 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
| 15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 20992 | Right and wrong concerns what other people cannot reasonably reject [Scanlon] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |