16 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |