36 ideas
19504 | My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
19503 | An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D] |
19505 | Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG] |
19499 | We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D] |
19500 | Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D] |
19502 | Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D] |
19498 | Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D] |
19506 | Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D] |
19496 | Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D] |
19497 | Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D] |
19495 | Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D] |
19501 | We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D] |
19507 | Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |