17 ideas
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
| 6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
| 23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
| 6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
| 6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
| 23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
| 4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
| 20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
| 6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |