19 ideas
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |