70 ideas
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| 23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
| 23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
| 23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
| 23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
| 23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
| 23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
| 23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
| 23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
| 23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
| 23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
| 23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
| 23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
| 23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
| 23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
| 23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
| 23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
| 23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
| 23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
| 23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
| 23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |