Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'The Ways of Paradox' and 'The Nature of Possibility'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
21695 The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
21693 Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
21691 Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21690 Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
21689 A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine]
21694 Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21692 If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
11003 The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]