Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility'

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Armstrong, by Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]