17 ideas
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |