14 ideas
| 11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
| 11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 14380 | The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca] |
| 11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |