25 ideas
1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |