77 ideas
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| 4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
| 4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
| 4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
| 4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
| 4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
| 4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
| 4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
| 4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
| 4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
| 4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
| 4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
| 4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
| 4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| 4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
| 4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
| 4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
| 4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
| 4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
| 4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
| 4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
| 4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| 4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
| 4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| 4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
| 4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
| 4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
| 4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
| 4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
| 4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
| 4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
| 4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
| 4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
| 4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
| 4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
| 4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
| 4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
| 4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
| 4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
| 4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
| 4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
| 4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| 4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |