13 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 16083 | Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 17006 | Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML] |
| 16093 | Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |