35 ideas
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |