14 ideas
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
8507 | Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong] |
8506 | Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong] |
8505 | Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |