17 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
17914 | He made a molten sea, which was ten cubits across, and thirty cubits round the edge [Anon (Kings)] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |