21 ideas
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |