11 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 8406 | Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford] |
| 8407 | A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |