13 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
| 5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |