Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universals and Particulars', 'Putnam's Paradox' and ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]