Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Models' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
17499 Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides]
17498 In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG]
17501 Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides]
17502 The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides]
17496 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides]
17497 Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17500 General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]