14 ideas
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
4442 | Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong] |
18617 | Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts [Mumford] |
18618 | Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality [Mumford] |
18619 | Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely [Mumford] |
18620 | Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more [Mumford] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |