Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Truth Rehabilitated' and 'Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9978 Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
23291 Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
23284 Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
23286 Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23288 When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
9986 The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9984 We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
23285 If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9981 Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait]
9982 Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
9985 Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9972 Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait]
9980 If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]