11 ideas
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |