Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universals and Particulars', 'Locke on Human Understanding' and 'Conjectures and Refutations'

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12 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]