Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A World of States of Affairs', 'Letters to Des Bosses' and 'Reply to 'Rorarius' 2nd ed'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]