Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universals and Particulars', 'Mathematics without Foundations' and 'Contextualism Defended (and reply)'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
9944 We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
9937 I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
9939 It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9940 Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9943 You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19558 Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
19561 We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
19563 The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
19560 Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19559 Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]