17 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |