13 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 16740 | A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
| 8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
| 8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
| 8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
| 8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
| 8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
| 16571 | Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |