11 ideas
| 18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |