10 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
20723 | Only when working people are poor do they remain obedient to God [Calvin, by Weber] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |