10 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| 14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |